

12 April

Hinton

Goldman

Stem / Klein / Kershaw  
Brooks

White Paper, 61, 65

Brooks - bonding

Sept 69

to Oct 69

to Oct 70

now

[Can I introduce any results?  
as evidence: ~~to~~

or will they call for all?

- Should we get into paper - we are glad  
to have Thai as Gov witness?



Stern — does article system?

Klein

Kershaw

Golech

Don Harris

Deitchman<sup>✓</sup>: ARPA Project

Johston<sup>✓</sup>

Ponturo<sup>✓</sup>

Cowan DE referring to cols: 1964-67-68

EGL — Chan

Markiewicz, Wehindy: should to RFR?

Dave Burke — on ECK, Sept? 1969

Peter Szanton?

Hard — on WSEG



CN

Function of DE testimony:

ONLY: IMAGE; WARM, LIKEABLE

(not: ~~upbeat~~  
~~bragging~~  
distasteful/prostern  
cold...)

- present myself as <sup>modest</sup> "the kind of guy  
they want to have down for dinner and  
serve bread pudding to." "I give them  
any excuse to let me off, they will."

Tell story of facts.

State of mind.

Express testimony — out.

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CN: Intro framework — no detail.

(relationships; G. O'Brien)  
Jobs, advice, how work, RAND work, VN.

(If any object — not technically achievable —  
but judge will give some latitude.)

[If blocked — shift to "state of mind."  
Rationality.]

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Facts on work with PP



12 April

- self-determination
- civil war: NLF "minority"
- why ARVN didn't fight, why GVN was corrupt  
(why NLF was otherwise)
- security as inside Dope

UN Center  
Dec. of Indep.

Vital interest

(I arrived: at Atlantic Center  
Lincoln Ed Langford  
(Ben Hue bridge)



CX: modest; saying can identify  
with, "my problems,"

Not: expert  
background

Not: DE vs. President (as a simple  
liar  
criminal)  
or DE vs American

(American over  
aggression  
Mexico's and not to know  
culpability)

But Congress was kind to,  
and public.



CN/DE

Accepting notion of sole <sup>Pres</sup> responsibility  
led me to rationalize direction of  
Congress, covered process, intent, action -  
DESPITE CONSTITUTION "OBSOLETE."  
[Other explanation didn't  
apply in 1940-50] made it me realize  
that sole responsibility = sole respon.  
for error, failure

and sole respons. for ending a war  
— short of clearcut success — is too great  
a burden for one man.

[Beltré; ECK... share responsibility  
(former Admin officials...) — (I) but they  
won't. I concluded...

by, Corp

(2) Hard for people to believe — they  
didn't want to believe that Pres would  
cover his clear intentions, or fail to end war shortly.

("Enemies" knew this — needed no proof —  
but the non "loyal" the American, the non  
trust of the Pres.)



Analogue: Decider, game-player (sign actor) 2.

Error control, error-correcting systems:

Thermostat; gen.

Pres = Player

= Controller.

Adaptive system; intelligent  
machines; problem-solving;  
SELF-REGULATING SYSTEM]

Assumed: better than attraction.

But - Churchill - democracy is the  
best worst form of gov, except for every  
other kind - including present one.

(Compare "function of gov control of info")  
to Error control.

But (VN) a system with human  
components etc.

But PP Paradox: 1961 (like 1964-65!)

Various types - eliminated (esp in 1940-50)

<sup>AT HIGH LEVEL - LIKE COW.</sup>  
Sameness of policy - repetition - seen from  
inside - Lack of "learning" -

despite

<sup>people</sup> (Congress, public)

- Pres misled - first in same way as  
subordinates. Hyp: for same reasons.

He too, was human; needed resources; wanted  
to keep his job; didn't want to "fail."



CN: - just say, I copied these (9)  
volumes.

- emphasize new appreciation of role of  
Congress

[I ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> ~~unright~~ <sup>unright</sup> & was wrong  
earlier - in attitude, and in

"How can control info; but vote  
Epe from Congress. From people?  
(SELF-GOVERNING COUNTRY)

See "Governor" of steam engine.  
Can't run so if Pres is "the  
controller" and all reporting to the  
public is by the Pres.

~~Earlier~~ Pres <sup>reports, news, from</sup> <sup>volume</sup> as part of the problem  
- for VNew, for US Gov, for public - for Pres  
himself. [= his unconst process].

Earlier: thought lying to the Pres was not diff  
different from lying by the Pres.

Basic "discovery" - Pres notions & actions are

similar to those of subordinates. (Not really  
"better" - more angelic - than Congress, press....



— How respond to:

Is it not a fact...

Is it not true...?

(when G. Nixon could not know

(b) it is not true.


9 April

— Jay: afternoon: getting supper with DN —  
talking to DN, not Jerry.

says "not like 9 to 5 — it was casual."



X



August, 1965 - Sept 66

talked to AR on 1st visit to villa  
(near Pastern) talked  $\frac{1}{2}$  hr.

Other time — with others, at dinner, parties,  
 $\frac{1}{2}$  dozen.

casual acquaintances.

Sept 66 - Feb 67 Outing

Feb - 67 — Econ + Social Correlates

April 67 - went into crop destruction study — asked by  
Bill Jones, found having been finished.

about July 4 - finished crop destruction <sup>study</sup> — saw DE

("lessons from VN" — "helping out McN")

Knew DE

[NO]

Sept 66 - Aug 67 : trip with Jean Roberts

AR  
Sept Aug 26 — returns Feb 68

worked on Econ + Social Correlates

[saw AR in first week in August, 67

Cell VR



Mon. April 68 capter findings

income posting related to security

late April — <sup>early May</sup> told AR, "I understand you're going  
back to college, as we haven't budgeted for  
you." (AR had told Jones) ... "till the end of the year."

Wrote to Int. Peace Society, Cambridge  
your critique of Mitchell-Milstein paper

[I was in Chicago, no more UN's; RFK killed]

AR left about April 23 — from Europe.

Sharon  
May — round into Shade House November

[Nov 3 - RFK

Sharon Bujett  
Bonnie Kerk  
Vangie Johnson  
Joe Kottus  
Ed Brunner



~ Feb 17, 69 to Wash (Hag - Adams)  
back ~ March 4, 69

Briefed SSR, Welf, Allen, 10:30 5 March

ECR meeting on VN questions 7 March

4 April: DE seminar: Violent Politics in VN

16 May - Pat arrives

25 May<sup>69</sup> - Bayesian Decision Theory

27-28 May Columbus Ohio, <sup>Richard</sup> Minear

14-16 June Israeli (on way to India)

June 22? Israeli leaves

June 18 Lyngman Camp on Hill

June 24-25 Mitchell seminar

June 27 Doolin. Wm (Gssavel)

Ray Sullivan - 8 July  
Bobrow ARPA 15 July

August 4, 1969 Vann arrives in CA

25-28 August Norwood



25-28 August Hanford

9 AM, Sept 18 Lager, Kellum, et al meeting

Sept 19, Rosenberg (Fide —

(24 dinner with Robertas)

26 Wallbach  
28 Sept Kellum, SF

(30 Sept....

6 Oct 551 - letter to NPT  
5 - Shei



Unger meetings  
Don Harris

IX-15 Feb. '65 Baguio

9 March - 15 Baguio

April 2-3 HERO Conference (EGL, HCL, Carver)

Monday '65 (4:30 meeting: VTM - Harding ??)

April 12 - Pat Mary party

Thursday:

<sup>Good</sup>  
April 16, Friday

Pat Mary

Saturday, April 17 - Passover

Peace March

Sunday, April 18, Easter  
cherry blossoms

20 April Pat. 1st talk

24 April Antivex

15 May National Travel-in  
18 May Rockcliffe



July 13 Pender Silver, Allen Whiting  
15 Cobby, Mendenhall  
(Hollister reception)

16 July 9:30 Vance

(19 July - to pick up Lois)

7 August Unger meeting / Candale  
11 August Mike Dunn (Cobby; Unger)  
12 August 9:30 Kovelhorst

14 August - call VTM, resign

20 Aug : 4: Candale, Bill Bundy  
22 Aug : Bohannon / Candale grab

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30 Aug ? arrives VN

5 Sept John Van

Col. Hollis  
Mr. Collins



DE talk about:

- NOT: - Swakini
- RAND Committee - "line-crosser"
- Swakini?
- Missile Dep; <sup>stand</sup> Milpatone; SIOP; Am Ambior
- authorization to JACEUR,

YES: - USCP? }  
- UA? } McG; Milpatone  
- PAC

Pres/SecDef lost of  
info, control.

- JFK and PSALM?

Knowledge of strategy:

dis: SU-OB  
Minner Dep

Plans (SI)  
C+C

R-290, etc: information

(Clearances)

Cuba II; Crisis Study: U-2


WSFG Studies; Shultz study

Leads:

Fryland; Richardson/\_\_\_\_; R-290; Haiter;  
Kahn; Hilman, Sorenson, Seales; Hughes, Donovan;  
Cuba II; Missile Dep/Alsep;



Jerry Rose / Ung ; Khang ; Poe

(- Honolulu? )

Report to Pres? Komer; III Corps; ...  
(Cadre... trips...)

RAMJET

Oct '66 : McN memo / Katz

Cham?

Rach Kim ; Patrol ; ...

Xoc Tien ?

Politicians : Ky memo.

DE/Thai memo.

Whelan - Wacker/DE memo.

Alternatives (ISA; RAND)

NSJM-1

Chowdhury book: 1967 : no right.

(?) legitimacy ; justifies 22/

RFK ?

(Torture: 222)

(?) companion to

SO in Hungary 222

(on Aug. 1956: DE: OSMC)

(as SO, UK, French, Israeli) & thought the war was on side of right



## Briefing in VN to visitors

Good intell on NCF, VC; Compton  
Passing of ARVN <sup>SMU</sup> <sup>5th Div</sup> <sup>Dec '65</sup>  
<sup>+ maladministration</sup>  
Resolution of VC <sup>April '67</sup>

Rock Kun (vs. Carver)

Reaction of US troops ("need" to violate orders)  
lack of "progress" or direction of it; STACOMATE

[cognitive problems: Pres has different info  
We don't understand, learn;  
image of GVN, whether it will win  
whether it deserves to be supported  
(Would USG support a reformed GVN?)

—— [Crisis problem: Pres doesn't understand effects  
of seeing, doing without info.]

[Ignorance: class basis of GVN, NCF — and USG]

Crisis: <sup>(3)</sup> Outsiders can't learn inside process  
or perception of "problem" [OUT: "problem"  
seen by insiders don't vary just because of different info]  
(b) Insiders confront to Outsiders, unable to learn: + Outsiders' different



Failure to learn ; - turn-over

- lack of SA, histories, maps
- ignorance of French plans
- ignorance of NCF, VNear, VN
- overabundance of need to learn

Military side of pac: security

RF/PF, intell

inhibition

an/ant

What I did not observe...

(even US low level advisors were good on observation of performance - but on diagnosis, prescription.)

See Taylor, etc... on VC "system."

I saw as "following in French footsteps, without learning

but then, how we had been <sup>very</sup> ~~bad~~ French (on our footsteps).

In 64-65, USG responded to "commitment", knowing "things were bad." But why had they gotten so bad; and why had we gotten committed.

Hyp: optimism, bad reporting. 1965-67 seemed to confirm this. (BUT: we had always known, at decision points, we got committed in 1945, "French War.")



Rund: PH D 62

Study of old Paul SA's, N/E's  
(Munich Gap; image of SU)

63 - Yarno

Ec Club, NATO & R

VN: TG

Sealton

~~to~~ 34A - presentation

election

habit - paper for collapse

Body

Plunder, Qui Non

White Paper, VC atrocities

Troops; combat

Tech - us

To go - USMC, ECL

DE assumption: US "need" to learn how to

combat R = US right to do so



Reviews - system analogy ignores:

hurdles, and

difficulties, conflict in them, a different  
parts of organism

Positive control PSC capability

Open-loop system

Security appears breakdown

"Error" will not be reported

Need for GO STOP signal

+ for centrally GO authentication, signal,  
interpretation

"Colloquial system" of CSC

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2 neurons for going Road

1 for extending in Mains

1 for going Mains

3 for going going to VN

1 for going 000



I distrust : being from Pres

(JSCP; SIOP; etc)

WSEG studies; (EST); similar step

Poe / ARW / Compton / GVN / XCF, ...  
lack of studies

Not explanation - 64-65; but I  
thought the operational.

Thought 1st would dismantle - to Pres -

PRD → company, challenge.

Finally, can't distrust being from  
Congress

Self-judging;

Public was misled (1960, 64, 68); many  
were not!

Lawrence → Luthin (not Party, personally)  
broken (quite not - bureaucracy.)

Contrast for Public ("As if a foreign  
analyst could find us - can't be used by  
Public?")



Current employment?  
When book published?

Income?

1. Birth

2. Marriage Children

3. Present employment & latest.

4. Academic background. (scholarship)

5. Marine

{ 6. Employment.

{ 7. VN (Time reporting.)

8. Views on best ways to help the country.

9. (Before reading PP).

9. Description of PP and my work.

10. Access to PP at RAND ~~and~~ SM

11. " " " at Rand ~~and~~ D.C.

12. Getting papers to Rand, S.M. - note, hsr  
13A - thing to mention

13. Getting 2d batch to Rand, August, 69.

14. Reading the PP. - LESSONS, '88 Hult on me.  
(CN: stay away from JCS on Dint)

15. PAAAN/ ~~Decision to print paper.~~

Inform. on policy.

16. Balté letter - alternatives to disclosure.

Rand letter. (ELK; McPherson, Wamke)



17. Decision to give to Congress.  
(then sent).

18. Implementation of decision.

(2) + JCS 21 + ~~other~~ Hunter

19. Awareness? of violation of law or regulation  
20. Competing loyalties/obligations: Const.



CV

- What I thought - not what you should think. Don't lecture you:
- ~~hoping~~ the Pres does not work - to help the country, adequately.

(No Pres is able to take the big decision - by himself - to end the war.

Then Bunt - trying to

My conclusions were... others right  
draw others - but they right to have a  
right to draw.

Early history of war...  
wrong from beginning; America  
from beginning...



1. How did you come to apply to join the Marine Corps in 1953?

(3 reasons)

2. Was there any impediment to your joining?

(none)

3. Did any <sup>other</sup> event in Indochina take place while you were in O.C.S.?

~~4. Were you offered a regular commission?~~

4. Were you offered a regular commission?

yes

4a. Did you accept it?

No

4b Why not?

5. What was your rank as a rifle company commander?

1st Lt — perhaps the only one in 2d Div.

6.



6. How did you come to extend your  
Tour in 1956?

(content)

7. How did you come to be asked to  
join the Rand Corporation in 1959?

4 factors

8. Was there a common theme to your  
professional work between 1959 and 1969?  
If so, what was it?  
WWII

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9. What was the subject matter of your  
professional work from 1959 ~~the~~ in the  
decade after 1959 1959?

Δ

Protecting + improving the national  
security of the U.S. (you went to USMC)

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10. Was there a common focus to that work?  
If so, tell the jury what it was.

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11. Please continue <sup>from where</sup> ~~to describe~~ your description  
from yesterday of that work in the 1960's.